This blog post addresses the course of the Syrian protest movement in the Suwayda Governorate from a perspective critical of the movement’s developments and its current and past potential. It is also an attempt to explain some phenomena that in my opinion have undermined this movement’s effectiveness at the broader Syrian level, and the impact of framing it within the boundaries of the 2011 Syrian revolution model.
There are multiple possible entry points in the attempt to define citizenship from a political perspective. From a social interaction point of view, citizenship is about people’s inter-relations as well as their spatial and institutional relations with their homelands. People’s participation in decision-making within their countries is one of the most evident entry points. This participation finds its way through several constitutional and lawful methods and ways guaranteed as rights granted to citizens, like the right to vote, for example. If these rights lose their meaning, or are rendered void, they open the door to the last possible and most confrontational form of rights, namely, protest. Despite protest being considered the last resort and the most confrontational method, it is a sign of how well or unwell the political climate is in addition to being its mender. Amid the complete alienation and indifference resulting from the failure to create a democratic path in our country, it is unsurprising that thousands are rallying, taking to the streets to reclaim their rights, sometimes through revolution and other times through political means.
For a year now, Suwayda city has been witnessing an ongoing protest movement started by a group of activists alongside local factions and religious and traditional forces in the governorate. This peaceful protest movement has reignited many emotions in the hearts of Syrians. It brought back the memory of popular protests in public spaces and restored a kind of respect for these protests that had been absent for years, after they were ignored by the authorities and accused of being a foreign tool aimed at destabilizing the country, in addition to their gradual decline and absence from the Syrian revolution.
Before delving into the analysis of the causes and consequences of the Suwayda movement, it might be necessary to try to understand the path of its protest movement. Undoubtedly, this protest movement emerged in the space of expression that Syrians carved out with their blood through their uprising over the past years, yet it does not entirely belong to the same movement. In fact, the grassroots popular movement within Suwayda City truly began in 2020 after several activists in the city launed a protest campaign under the slogan of “We want to live with dignity”. This came as a reaction to the worsening living conditions following the implementation of the Caesar Act and the consequences of the government’s lockdown decision as a result of the spread of COVID-19. This campaign marked the first wave of protests. It resumed with a second wave early 2022, and then again in a third wave at the end of the same year, which escalated into direct confrontation with security forces after the governorate’s building was burned by protestors, causing casualties on both sides.
The Suwayda protests marked a new phase in the Syrian protests that suggested a potential role in reshaping the image and outcomes of protest movements in the minds of Syrians. The governorate’s unique characteristics, in terms of its location and social composition, was essential in refuting the initial official narrative about the sectarian nature of the 2011 protests. Moreover, the slogans that sparked these protests were also instrumental in raising cross-cutting issues for citizens weighed down by dire living conditions. Although these issues may seem distant from the causes and slogans that preceded them over the years, they can still pave the way for new protest ground that rallies Syrian women and men in remaining governorates. This, in turn, could perhaps contribute to shaping a new space for political manoeuvring, which people agree is narrow, but through which they can break free from the confines of the previous space drawn by the authorities - one that is limited in its elements and settled in its prospect, a space which no protest can disturb its forced peace. However, none of this happened. Our Revolution’s legacy has become a burden to the new generation of protestors.
In his book about the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, American philosopher Thomas Kuhn argues that every era has its own scientific model which he calls the “paradigm”, through which scientists explain all scientific phenomena particular to their era. In its wider sense of the word, this paradigm is a set of common beliefs, values, and techniques in which scientists believe and adopt to explain phenomena. When a new phenomenon emerges and this paradigm is unable to explain it, a revolution takes shape to overthrow this paradigm, despite its fierce resistance. It has become evident that the Suwayda movement has fallen into the trap of the revolutionary paradigm, whose political trajectory, as we can observe, has reached a dead end, particularly with the emergence of signs of the latest regional agreements that have taken centre stage on the political scene. This fall was induced by the use of the same slogans used by protest movements since March 2011, in addition to the same protest symbols and techniques, like raising the revolution’s flag, evening protests, and several protest methods we had interacted with and experienced most of our feelings through, from the joy of the first shout and feeling that victory is close, to defeat and failure at different political, military, and social levels.
Everyone was under the impression that these protests are a mere extension of the Syrian uprising that started in 2011, and this is the first paradox that I believe diverges from the reality on the ground. As if the people of Suwayda sensed embarrassment by their explicit expression of economic-related living demands, which were the main spark that ignited this wave of protests. This embarrassment is understandable if we take into consideration the cautious reasoning of any religious minority living in a majority setting, particularly after a conflict that was deliberately portrayed as one between a majority and a coalition of minorities.
This embarrassment has missed out on the opportunity to restore protests role in the Syrian political equation, even if with demands far less ambitious than previous ones in other squares. However, these demands might be the first step on a path of accumulating gains within the political sphere. A year ago, at a critical juncture at the local and regional levels, the people of Suwayda had an opportunity to reproduce a new protest wave that would have united the Syrian people and been significant for their civic participation.. However, it soon became less likely that this opportunity will see the light, particularly amid attempts to reduce this movement within Suwayda to the 2011 Revolution paradigm. And so, protest movements in the remaining regions subsided few days after reacting to the protest in Suwayda, a retreat that seems understandable for the people after a bitter experience at different levels.
Furthermore, many of the movement’s capacities declined after the rise of the people of Suwayda’s religious communitarian symbols during protests (al-Karama Square). Even if it is possible to provide a cultural explanation to these symbols, they will “add fuel to the fire” at the political level given the Syrian context’s relevant sensibilities and complexities. As time passed and the communitarian voice, represented by armed factions and religious dignitaries—most notably Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri—grew louder, the citizenship dimension, in its unique political sense, became subjected to conflicts within al-Karama Square (al-Karama Square). As if the convening power that characterized the movement in its early stages had become an apple of discord, with parties growing away from each other over time and as positions are put to the test.
All of the above parallels the ongoing social and political efforts by the authorities, aimed at dismantling this situation through a series of simple and continuous measures. At times, the resort to incentives, such as security settlements for deserters, ex-convicts and others, in addition to new, relatively highly-profitable offers to volunteer in the army. At other times, it is done through intimidation by appointing a governor with a known security background, attempts to establish checkpoints within the city, and leaked videos of security and military reinforcements headed to the governorate. All of these actions serve to weaken the real impact that this movement could have had, a movement that could have been pragmatically leveraged in the internal political action logic, even within the narrow confines of Syrian political geography.
Our civic participation is a political act, and politics, just like nature, abhors the vacuum, and knows no going back. The goal behind critique is avoiding mistakes that can be avoided in the future; the vacuum here formed in a period that preceded the waves of protest in Suwayda. It was a result of political elites’ failure to form at least one genuine political body, capable of seizing such a moment to express people’s needs practically, through its values and principles of work. Such a body could have contributed to shaping a political vision rooted in its ideology, grounded in reality, and informed by its interpretation of the Syrian political landscape and its numerous facts and variables.
In the absence of this, it was only natural for actors to replace this role with either the paradigm of a politically defeated revolution, or by invoking the communitarian legacy and the traditional structures and symbols it entails, and which would weaken and marginalize the individual civic identity dimension. It is therefore inevitable to have genuine political and institutional organizations that build on specific principles and values, not a temporary position, enabling them to shape a clear political vision and present action programmes. If this is not feasible now—and that is normal— at least the common space created by the protesters can be used for meeting, dialogue, and a logical evaluation of the previous phase, based on what was gained and what was missed, to finally escape the suicidal mindset that says: "We no longer have anything to fear losing”. At least we’re still alive!
Translated by: Tala Noujeim
Okab Fakher, Syrian researcher and community activist, from the governorate of Suwayda. He is currently enrolled in an MA in Arabic Philosophy and Humanities. His interests include the Syrian public sphere in which he has been active since 2011. He has been working on social research for almost five years now.
The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
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